COP26 and China: What does success look like?
This is a complete transcript of the COP26 and China event panel discussion, chaired by Alicia Kearns MP. She was joined by Isabel Hilton, Amber Rudd and Alex Wang.
Alicia Kearns
Thank you, everyone for joining the China Research Group today and to all our esteemed guests, and all those joining to participate in debate today. A very timely discussion, which is COP 26 and China. What does success look like? We haven't got long now until all things kick off and Glasgow and we've got some fantastic speakers to talk to us about what they think success looks like, what the thorny issues might be. I'm sure they need no introduction.
But just in case, we have Amber Rudd, who obviously is the former home secretary and was also Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change during the Paris climate negotiations. We've got Isabel Hilton, who is the founder of China Dialogue, which is a think tank devoted to building a shared approach on climate change environmental issues. And she's widely known as a speaker on the topic that we'll be leaving us on time today to go and do exactly that and speak some of the media about these issues. Finally, we have Alex Wang who's a professor of law at UCLA. So Alex, thank you so much for joining us at some unearthly hour, it really is appreciated. And he is a leading expert on environmental law and the politics of China. He was also previously the senior attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council based in Beijing. So I'm sure he's gonna have a lot to guide us on.
For my part, you know, this is such a fundamental question for next few weeks. I'm hoping, if I may indulge, that our speakers will talk us through China's significance in all these discussions. How high should our expectations be for COP 26? Has the US done enough has the UK done enough to make COP 26 a success? What is China's stake in combating climate change? And finally, the big question, which is what is the cost of China's cooperation on climate change? They're well known for saying in negotiations with governments around the world, that there's no oasis in the desert, you don't get to criticize us all the time and not be on board with us, and then suddenly expect us to come to some amazing, immaculate oasis of cooperation when you suddenly want it on things like climate change.
And obviously, this is all happening in the backdrop of increased tensions, shall we say, between Beijing and London. So obviously, we've got all the sanctions. Again, which essentially are an attack on UK democracy. We've got the genocide taking place against the Uyghur, we've got the South China Sea tensions, it's a difficult time for Beijing and London. But that doesn't mean we can't cooperate on certain matters. So I'm very much looking forward to hearing from our three speakers. If you have any questions at any point, please just put them in the Q&A. And then we will come to you all as soon as our speakers have finished. But enough for me and over first, Amber. Amber, the stage is yours.
Amber Rudd
Thank you so much Alicia. Great pleasure to be here. And I really welcome the focus the CRG have put on this of all weeks. So in Paris six years ago, we saw that the Chinese very much playing an active part in the negotiations, and in making sure that we got an agreement. We were concerned in the UK and the wider EU at the time, that China and the US might do a deal that lacked ambition. And we were determined to make sure that they stepped up that ambition. So that's partly why you see the language which is the aim of the Paris Agreement is to keep two degrees within reach, but preferably to aim for one and a half degrees, which has now become the default of the aim of the global community to aim for maximum increase of one and a half degrees. Now I don't want to underestimate the difficulty of engaging with China even six years ago, but it's easy to acknowledge that the situation is entirely different now in terms of their relationship with where you said with the UK, but let's face it with the US. The biggest players in climate change negotiations are the biggest emitters, and that means the US, China, Europe, not as big, but still a major participant and any other sort of block group really. And the aim of the Glasgow COP is to keep one and a half degrees within reach.
What's China's position in that? Well, first, if I may, the good news. The good news is that China has been very engaged in producing renewable energy itself. It's one of the biggest participants in onshore wind, and solar, and in new tech to try and drive renewable energy. So it's good that they're such active participants, they have a third of the world's solar is in China, they're really investing in the area. Of course, the other reason to invest in the area is to make sure that as the world moves towards a green industrial revolution, they can have the tech that leads on it as well, that is totally consistent with their approach to Belt and Road and influence in general to make sure that they are. It's also estimated that there are 20,000 protests in China per year largely about pollution, I'm sure, Isabel'll be able to give us a better hand on that or not. But the general awareness is that in China, there is a need to do this. And of course, the Chinese government, the Chinese people, like everybody else, can see the ravages of climate change taking place now. Since six years ago, we now see the droughts, the floods, it's completely different environment to where it was six years ago. Sadly, it's also a completely different environment, in terms of the relationship with the US and China. And as you rightly said, the Chinese take a view that you can't ask for one thing and take away with the other, if you've got a relationship with China its going to be consistent on one level, and you can't shop and change.
Now, that's a great shame, because the relationship is particularly cold at the moment, my own view is that China is on a pretty reasonable trajectory to decarbonise, but it's not going to play necessarily, the Americans or indeed the UK's - given that we hold the COP presidency - game and getting them to kowtow, perhaps dangerous word, but still to participate as we would like them to, to submit an ambitious NDC, to bring forward when they're going to peak with their carbon emissions. They just don't want to fold into doing that, even though to a large extent, they may be likely to do it. So success will look like for us a bit more information. A bit more information of the positive things they are doing, because they have the same self interests as we do.
Finally, I just observe that they really know what they're doing. There's no suggestion that they are holding back because they are unsure of what they're doing. They know exactly what they're doing, both diplomatically and also practically. I recall saying six years ago to the Chinese representative on climate change, who was Xie Zhenhua. I said to him in a sort of rather sort of I thought, friendly way - is this your first COP? And he says no, I was at COP 1. He is again, the representative this year, they are very experienced participant. Thank you.
Alicia Kearns
Amber, you've already got me thinking of lots of questions for you. But I shall hold back, Isabel over to you.
Isabel Hilton
Thank you very much, and thank you also for the invitation. So I want to pick up where Amber left off really. And I thought it might be useful, just to try and distinguish between the long term and the short term issues in China's approach to climate.
And the long term issue is, as Amber has described, is that since the middle of the first decade of the century really, China has both understood the extreme threat that climate poses to China - think of all those Delta cities, think of the water distribution, the cryosphere, the Qinghai Tibet plateau, etc. All of that creates extreme vulnerability in a country that doesn't have a lot of environmental headroom to begin with. And secondly, that perception came at a time when the negative effects of China's industrial revolution were bearing down rather on public policy. People were very fed up about air and water pollution, soil pollution and so on. And they were complaining very vocally about it. And that industrial policy which had produced that environmental crisis was played out. It was, you know, the Asian model, which in China is just a bigger version of the Asian model gets to a point where your catch up phase is exhausted and you have to get smarter in your economy, and in your technology and in your industrial policy.
So all of that came together to make the Party look at the future, both in terms of the threat of climate change, but also as something around which its next industrial policy could be organized. And it set out, in the 12th and the 13th and now the 14 Five Year Plan to invest heavily in low carbon technologies with the ambition of becoming the world's leading supplier of those to a carbon constrained world, investing across the piece in, in new technologies, including electric vehicles, renewables and so on. And at that point, whatever the rate of China's mitigation, however fast or slow, China reduces its domestic emissions, that industrial policy is a commitment to a process into an understanding of the process from which China, you know, hasn't wavered.
So does that mean that China is reducing its emissions fast enough? No, of course, not. Because China had committed very heavily in the first phase of its industrial revolution, particularly to coal. And because the drivers of that phase are still, you know, they may be moribund, but you know, like zombies, they're still knocking around in the economy. So the construction, for example, which has driven a great deal of China's GDP and supported provincial budgets and city budgets, outside, you know the central finances, all of that was extremely high emitting, it involves large amounts of cement and steel, usually produced with very high emitting sources of energy. And that kind of continues. You see the recovery from COVID, for example, returning to a model that is just, you know, it's something you can pull the lever on, and you get a kind of quick response in the economy. So you know, you borrow a new build. And we saw that after the financial crisis, and we've seen that in COVID.
So you get these regressions into the old model of the economy, because there are other considerations. How, you know, when people lose their jobs, there are vested interests pushing back, there are all kinds of things going on within a very large economy that's trying to make a complex transition. But I don't think that means that China is going backwards or has changed its mind, or is it any less serious about climate change? What it does alter, though, is the pace and the focus.
So where are we? Well, you will no doubt recall that at the UN General Assembly in 2020, Xi Jinping made a pledge committed China to net zero by 2060, and to peak carbon emissions by 2030 or earlier, if possible. That was followed by the 14 five year plan, which we all waited eagerly to see, you know, well, okay, now we see what they're going to do to meet the 2060 target. And it was frankly, rather a disappointment. That target only got one mention in a 148 page document. And what was much under discussion rather than net zero by 2060, was energy security. And that is a reflection of the geopolitical tensions that Amber also referenced. Because if you are looking at an uncertain world, as China is, if you're looking at the kind of rivalry that we see between the US and China now and the kind of tensions in the neighborhood, then you start to look at your energy security with new eyes. And you know, perfectly well that what China has in some abundance domestically, the thing it doesn't have to import usually is coal. And that means that coal then gets, it doesn't get reduced, it doesn't get removed, as it might, if we were looking simply at at a climate ambitions because energy security is going to make China's planners hang on, and it did in the 14th plan. We see coal is still there. It's meant to peak by by 2025, but it is still there. And that was a disappointment.
And there were a number of other disappointments frankly, in the plan. There's no overall carbon cap. There were a lot of things that didn't happen. So the next thing that did happen, was the next UN General Assembly in which China announced no new coal on the Belt and Road, and equally importantly, that China would direct its external investment to supporting emerging economies to build renewable systems rather than high carbon energy systems. And that's their hugely important announcement. And that's an important contribution. It doesn't again, mean that China's domestic use of coal is sinking as much as any of us would like or indeed at all right now. But again, we return to those tensions and we return to the dislocations of the pandemic, we return to the kind of energy crisis supply crisis that China has been going through in the last in recent months. So these are relatively short term in my view, and I think that we will see a return to a more cogent plan to meet 2060. What the kind of planners that we talked to in China would prefer to see, is a much stronger commitment for reductions up to 2030. Bringing forward the 2030 target, which was a loose target in Paris six years ago, and remains a loose target, there is room to move that. And the expectation has been that four COP 26, China would move it and could move it to 2025 or 2026, it now looks far more like 2028, if at all.
However, what we are seeing is the emergence of serious planning under the Ministry of Environment, which now has the climate portfolio and has a leading group which was headed by Han Zheng, the Minister, that is beginning to produce very solid planning strategies called N Plus One which is. Sorry, '1+N' which is a tiresome title, but it breaks down across all industrial sectors and is setting target for steel peaking and setting targets for circular economy, setting targets across the economy for the implementation of a serious climate plan. So again, it's another indication that China is serious.
As Amber says, China isn't going to do this because we asked it to. China's doing it for its own reasons. It's doing it because it sees both the opportunity and the risk. And I think it's a mistake to assume that whatever Britain says to China on climate is really going to make much difference. There is in China, as in the United States that quite a strong trend of populist nationalism, which means that Xi Jinping does not wish to be seen at home to be doing the bidding, particularly if the United States, but actually of any foreign power. So he will present this, as you know, the wisdom of the party, the party having the welfare of the people at its heart, and the party leading China to be a responsible global actor. And that's really where if we have influence at all, that's where we should exercise it. It's holding China to account for its own promises as a responsible global actor. And I think that's, you know, that's probably the most productive kind of pressure that we could we can put. So I'll pause there very happy to answer questions.
Alicia Kearns
That was an encyclopedic analysis of where we are. So thank you so much, Isabel. Professor Alex Wang over to you. But just a quick reminder everyone, do put your questions in the Q&A and we'll come to you just after Alex has spoken. Alex over to a very early you.
Alex Wang
Terrific, so greetings from California, it's a tough act to follow two very good sets of comments. So I'll make a number of meta points here. As mentioned before, my experiences, I focus on sort of law, policy and governance. In my previous life as a representative of an American NGO, working in China. And then these days, I continue to do that, through UCLA, and also through participation in the California-China Climate Initiative. And so just a few points I'd like to make.
One is, in terms of how we could get China to increase their ambition, I think one of the biggest things that we can do is to lead by example, right. A lot of the discussions have been centering cooperation, when really the key thing is for developed countries to be able to show that they can make this happen in reality. So in UK, the move to get rid of coal has a tremendous practical and symbolic impact given given the history of coal in the UK. And in the United States, we're still struggling right now, in some respects, to get things through Congress and to make things happen. We were talking about Joe Manchin earlier before this event started. But we do have bright spots in the United States and one of the reasons California has engaged with China in significant part is because there's actually a lot of commonality in the way that California approaches climate change. And there's lots of points of, of convergence where they can share ideas, we can share ideas.
And so really, by leading by example, will create the sense that it's not just the Western powers being hypocritical and going over and putting pressure on China. I think it's extraordinarily important that John Kerry and others when they engage with China, to put pressure on China, because China is the largest emitter, and we don't solve this problem without Chinese action, and arguably things like China's stopping overseas financing of coal are related to that engagement with the outside. I completely agree with the previous comments that primarily China is more influenced by the domestic politics and domestic economic factors. But on the margins where we can put pressure, I think things like that engagement and that sense - I don't think Chinese leaders want to have a sense that they are getting behind the Western countries. And so the overseas call announcement was one example where they were feeling a lot of pressure with the the distance between what they were doing and their pronouncements was becoming significant.
Now on on the Chinese side, just yesterday, in preparation for this, I was poring over, a new document was just released online, the 1+N document was released in Chinese and English and it's a really useful read, because it gives you a sense of the overall programme that has, frankly, been developing in China for the last 15 years. So when I was based in China, we began to see in the 11th Five Year Plan after 2006, the beginnings of this system by using targets for bureaucrats, putting pressure on companies through a top down system with targets, and then an array of policies and programmes designed to implement those targets. And so you'll see in the 1+N exactly the sort of more mature version of that now. So we know all about the targets and the pronouncements. And this is meant to be the way that those targets become reality. And so we know of all of the potential shortcomings of a sort of hard target system the way it can drive falsification, and it can drive what academics called goal displacement, essentially doing things that aren't in support of the goals.
But, you know, on the whole we've seen in the 15 years, although implementation has not been perfect, it's a very good sign that they've continued to push the system, they can continue to develop it, and they're realistically dealing with the challenges, right? How do you balance these goals with economic goals, with energy security goals with other types of issues? And so I very much agree with Amber Rudd's comment about information and transparency. I think that is one of the critical things the world, global observers can do is to hold China - and Isabel Hilton made this point as well - is to sort of verify and hold China to its promises and to keep that pressure on.
And then a final point I'll make is just on this discussion about cooperation versus competition. I've been on countless panels about this topic this year. And there's been a way that the media framing of this has again centred cooperation too significantly I think. I think that what we're realistically going to see is a combination of cooperation and competition. It's just natural in a world where China is rising, and there are such great differences in values. We're obviously going to have competition, I think that's a good thing that we're engaging on these things. Tonight at 5pm, California time, I'm hosting a panel through our Human Rights Center on the Xinjiang issue, the Uyghur crisis. And so these things have to be confronted. The notion of an oasis versus separating these issues, I think is not realistic and it doesn't have to be. Right? I think, China's very pragmatic and recognizes that there are areas that they will just - despite the sort of high level conflictual rhetoric, we still have lots of cooperation going on anyway, at the subnational level, academic level or corporate level, these types of things.
So I wrote a piece on the possibilities on the competitive side, which I think we should focus more attention on how to make the competition constructive. And I'll just mention the points I made in that piece. And what I highlighted in that piece was just the idea that because China has a lot of self-interested motives for moving on climate, namely economic reasons, diplomatic reasons, and sort of reputational or legitimacy reasons. I think on all those fronts, there can be a healthy competition, in terms of fighting to be a leader on clean tech. Competition is a good thing, right? It drives innovation, companies want to out compete each other and we need that rapid speed, innovation that can be generated by competition. On the diplomatic front, there's been a lot of talk about cooperation or competition in developing countries, and I think that's important. The US has made statements that they will green their overseas finance, and frankly, the US can do better in that area. Right. I think the goals are there, and the US should show that they can implement well on that, and China has rightly been criticised for what they've done on the Belt and Road supporting kind of unsustainable projects.
And that competition, you know, the analogy could be vaccine diplomacy, right, you saw this battle in Vietnam over who was going to deliver more vaccines. That's not a bad thing for Vietnam, if they actually end up getting more vaccines. And likewise, for other countries, if they can get more out of the sort of world powers that's a good thing. And then on the issue of reputation and legitimacy, I think that's a real battle, I think that's on the minds of the senior Chinese leaders, they are making a case that their more top down approach to governance is at minimum as legitimate as Western democracies, if not, you know, some people quietly in private rooms will say it's even better than the West. And I think that's an issue and the leaders are trying to prove that to the world. They're trying to prove it to their allies in the developing world, right, these things matter for sort of diplomatic relations and votes at the UN. Right, on lots of other issues. And, frankly, coming from the US where democracy is not in the healthiest shape, American democracy needs a little bit of a jolt to show that it can really live up to its promise. Right? So again, this competition is not the worst thing in the world. So with that, I'll stop there. But I look forward to the conversation.
Alicia Kearns
Thank you so much for that, it was incredibly helpful. I'm going to kick off with chairs prerogative of asking my own question, but then mix in one from Mark Logan, who is a Conservative MP, probably has spent more time in China than any other conservative MP. So he brings a really helpful insight.
My question, I'm going to kick off with Amber when you were negotiating with the Chinese, what did you see as, for what's a better word, the biscuits that China actually effectively bought, and brought them to the negotiating table? And then once it was at the negotiating tables, what are the sort of offers or tactics that actually see them shift policy? Whether it was an environment or any other issue? And then that leads to Mark's question, which is in terms of China's decision making on climate change, what percentage breakdowns do we think will be influenced by domestic pressures, rather than external international pressures? So if I go to you first Amber, and then if over the other speakers would like to speak, just give me a nod, and I'll come straight to you.
Amber Rudd
Thank you, Alicia. So I think that one of the things to bear in mind is that every country attending has their own stakeholders. So in a democracy, we have the voters, we have the businesses we want to influence in the UK to make sure they deliver. You know, we have different political parties' agendas, dare I say it, and China is no different in that way. They have their own stakeholders. And as Isabel said, you know, you can't have them looking like they are agreeing to something, and pleasing somebody other than themselves. Everybody's got their own form of nationalism. So I think that it's the ultimate diplomatic environment basically, you know, everybody's got to feel that they may have compromised, but they have one as well. And they can go back to their own country and say, we've delivered for you.
For China, China in Paris was very different to China now, because they were willing to participate to a much higher degree. And as I said in my opening remarks, is that our concern was much more that China and the US would agree or had agreed something which lacked ambition. And everything I've learned about that subsequently has turned out what was the case, but everybody else pushed them to be more ambitious. That relationship between China and the US isn't in the same place by any means. So it's much more difficult to interpret. And I think that I would expect that China has its own plan, and will slowly reveal it to us in its own time.
Alicia Kearns
I was on mute, embarrassing. Isabel over to you. Thank you, Amber.
Isabel Hilton
Thank you. There were a number of questions. I mean, the US-China relationship, which had been a real problem at Copenhagen, and there were many problems at Copenhagen but that was an absolutely central one and the Xi Jinping, Barack Obama, handshake two years before COP really made Paris possible. It was one of many things that made Paris possible but without it, I think Paris would have been even harder. And I have to say the French did an absolutely superb job in the preparation and the delivery of Paris. But that central handshake between Xi Jinping and Brock Obama to agree to work together towards an agreement in Paris, and then to agree to ratify it quickly. That was, you know, to get it accepted quickly, that was extremely important.
So, you will recall that in various things happened in 2016, among them, there was a marked change of government in the United States. In 2017 at the World Economic Forum, Xi Jinping appears and makes a speech to a rather anxious global elite. And it's quite it's worth remembering what he said. He essentially said that China is consistent in its commitments, it will not resign from its from its commitment to the Paris Agreement. It is a responsible player in a globalised system. And I was asked at various events after Paris, you know, whether I was concerned that China would honour its promises, and I said without claiming any particular foresight that I was far more worried about United States, not honoring its commitments, because that is the pattern of American behavior, signing up to Kyoto, never ratifying it, you know, signing up to Paris withdrawing, coming back in, we're now facing the prospect that the midterms could upend President Biden's climate ambitions, again, let alone the next election where we could see a reversion to the status quo as of 2016. And, you know, China is steadily and consistently committed to the UNFCCC, whereas we all you know, live in nailbiting terror of the next electoral event in the United States, and it really matters.
So China gains reputation every time the United States goes into one of its one of its reverse courses. And that matters, both the climate for China's domestic politics and for China's international reputation. So as Alex said, the best thing we can do now to encourage China to behave better is to behave better ourselves.
Alex Wang
So unfortunately, what Isabel Hilton says about the US is quite true and much to my chagrin, but on the China point, I think what one thing that China will want out of these types of international meetings is to leave the impression that it is doing a lot and more than others. And so you've seen this. So the 1+N document is the perfect example of that. It sort of inundates you with a flood of policies. And of course, there's a question about what's really going on how much of it is sort of vapourware? How much of it is real, well, what's really being achieved? But the the effort to show that they're doing a lot, you'll see this, if you're going to the meeting, they've used the China pavilion at the COPs in this way. If you think back, those of you were in Copenhagen, that was sort of China just getting used to the attention it was getting, and they were sort of woefully unprepared at the COP and they were flooded every day and overwhelmed with people visiting. And since then they've they've developed the same sort of programme at the China built pavilion where they will just have one programme after another showing all the countless things that they're doing. And so that's the general message. They want to lead the world.
So I think that the trick is, how to give China credit where they've done something positive, but how do we how do we then continue to apply the appropriate pressure? Because they simply, you know, like many countries, they have not done nearly enough, right? So you know, they should be praised for trying to put in an emissions trading system but that emissions trading system has no cap. It actually subsidises some coal plants, right? It has lots of problems that need to be called out. So that balance is quite important and will be one of the things that you'll see playing out at the at the COP.
Alicia Kearns
Thanks, Alex. Isabel I'm gonna come back to your question from Adam Barnett. So he's saying how does the politics of China around COP 26 intersects the politics of the Chinese biodiversity conference COP 15 in Kunming next year. So Amber was saying, for example, that China doesn't want to play by COP 26 as Western rules, but isn't it actually in their interest to be cooperative at COP 26 so others then act similarily at COP 15, so that China's own summit can be seen as more successful, actually be more of a success.
Isabel Hilton
I mean, I think I wouldn't quite agree with the formulation that China sees the UNFCCC processes, you know, a Western process, it's a UN process, and China has been part of it right from the start. And China actually is, you know, very active player in the UN. And one of the criticisms of China these days is that it's managing to bend UN rules, kind of in favour of Chinese characteristics, rather more than we would wish, particularly on things like human rights. So it's not that China sees it as a Western process, it's that China doesn't want to be seen to act only when called upon by other powers. So China will present its participation in COP 26, and the whole UNFCCC process as a function of, as I say, the wisdom of the party and China's long term climate ambitions. and China will set its own pace for that participation, taking absolutely into, and I completely agree with what Alex says about China wishing to be seen as a responsible player.
On COP 15, the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity) COP, this has been interesting because the CBD is very much the poor relation of the UN conventions. I don't know, if you've been to a CBD COP. It's quite a contrast with a climate COP, much less well attended, much less clear in its ambitions, and every single target that was set in Aichi has been missed. So you know, the process is essentially failing. And actually the the biodiversity crisis is extremely serious, we're in the middle of a mass extinction.
Now one of the difficulties has been that clearly, the biodiversity crisis and climate are connected, but they're not particularly well connected in the UN process. And people are trying now to make that connection better with things like nature-based solutions and all of that strand of work. But you can't save biodiversity if you don't, you know, if you don't act firmly on climate, but you can have a better process in biodiversity, have clear targets and more accountability. And now we're looking at setting a new set of targets for the next decade with China, you know, hosting, COP 15. And I have to say China has pretty much underperformed as, as host of COP 15. Because it's not the kind of diplomacy that China is particularly good at China is not, you know, proactive in these processes. It doesn't like to be out in front, it likes, you know, to kind of put on a good show and get the catering really good and all of that, and, you know, have some good domestic programmes to announce which it has.
But actually as a proactive knocker of heads together, the kind of mobilization that the United States can do when it's engaged, you know, that kind of getting everybody in in a row or, you know, just using US diplomatic weight, you don't see China doing that around something like COP 15. And that has been unfortunately, rather, it's been a bit of a hole in the process. That plus the fact that the UN Secretariat isn't isn't that ambitious either. So I think it's going to be disappointing, but I think that China will present it very much in terms of its domestic programme of redlining and you know, its creation of very sophisticated and connected, protected areas. But it may not go beyond that.
Alicia Kearns
Great unless any of the other panelists want to come in. I'll move to the next question. No, brilliant. The next question is, does China go into this meeting with higher than usual social capital with the Global South, given the vaccines, repercussions of AUKUS and Southeast Asian diplomacy? And how might this play out in Glasgow and that question's from Denise Young who'd like to take that one number over to you?
Amber Rudd
I'd like to take it, and with also with a question to Isabel if I may. In terms of COVID and vaccines, there's a lot of concern that the less developed countries are going to be I mean, irritated is the gentlest form of choice of words. They're being expected to engage in a global agreement, but they're not being supported by the West to have vaccines. So 5% of Africa has has been vaccinated, and yet they're being expected to participate with us. So I think there's a real problem there with COP as we go into it.
And in Paris, there was very much a feeling that the African countries were very much influenced by China. And although China itself wasn't sort of playing at blowing things up in terms of the Paris Agreement, and definitely wanted agreement, there was a slight frisson of concern that they might use their influence amongst African countries, to potentially upset the delicate balance between money and commitment, because at the end of the day, a lot of this is going to be about money. So could I ask Isabel, do you think that the whole issue towards whether African countries are going to be satisfied they've reached, they can reach an agreement with the West when they haven't been given enough support on the vaccine and whether they've had enough commitment on the money, which also is going to be influenced by China participating with those countries to try and push them a certain way?
Isabel Hilton
I think it is. Very good question Amber, I'm not sure that I can be definitive on it. But I think I do remember Copenhagen, that moment, when the Marshall Islands turned to China and said, you know, you are our problem. You know, it's not just, it's not just the United States, or the industrialized countries that have created this. And that unless China was willing to, you know, change, its position, the Marshall Islands were going to drown. And that was a bit of a moment in G77. China has enormous influence with countries in G77 because it's the biggest trading partner and the biggest investor in most of them. And it uses it certainly uses that influence over things like human rights resolutions, where, you know, the China routinely gets more votes, whatever the issue, than a US or a European motion does.
You're absolutely right, that there is real anger, I think, in in the G77, in the LMCs, and so on because we have never delivered on the $100 billion commitment. And, the vaccines if you know, is pretty shocking show - plus the United Kingdom cut back its foreign aid. So for all these, all these signals are pretty negative how far China will want to exploit those. I don't think China will want to wreck the COP. I do think China will use the failings of the industrialised countries of the US and Europe in this regard to enhance its own reputation.
I think, though, that China's reputation is not quite in the same place as it was five years ago. And that's partly because some of the shine has come come off Belt and Road, we've seen for example, you know, before China, cancelled its commitment to it before China promised not to build any more coal on the Belt and Road. We'd seen waves of cancellations from host countries of coal fired power projects, because they were essentially going to be stranded assets, because there were questions about debt, there are questions about return on investment. And all of that is, you know, it's not that China is universally popular wherever it invests. It's got a little more complicated than that. But it is still quite true that the failure of the West, loosely defined, to fulfill its promises both on the $100 billion, and its moral obligation on vaccines. That's really, it's important. I mean, the $100 billion won't transform the climate prospects of the emerging economies - that is down to the trillions of investment that need to shift. But the $100 billion is very important for the atmosphere and the general mood in Glasgow, and I'm afraid it's, you know, it's not great.
Alicia Kearns
Brilliant. Thank you both. Alex, I'm going to come to you but I'm also go through another question to you, which is, Kevin Langford was asking, as you answer that, does China actually care about the level of emissions in the US and the UK and other partners? Obviously UK has a very tiny amount of emissions, but does it? Does China really care about what other countries do in terms of emissions? Do they have objectives to reduce the emissions of other countries?
Alex Wang
Yeah, so. So I'll answer that question. But I wanted to add, I completely agree with what Isabel was saying about the dynamics. But I would add that even though you know, China has been making gains and the relationships with those countries all is not lost. for the US or Europe, right, because I think a lot of countries see some a lot of the developing countries see a benefit in a hedging strategy, because they're not completely comfortable with China, yet the West has also not treated those countries particularly well as well. So if there is a room where the I think a lot of countries would invite, sort of multiple suitors, essentially right, and then that could be played to the advantage of those, those countries. So going forward, there's room for the US and Europe to do much better and to compete well, in this regard.
In terms of the level of emissions in the US, you know, I think, at a high level, I would imagine leaders would would care to the extent that they just care about the, you know, solving the climate change problem, but you're not seeing China really trying to push the US or other countries in the same way. Rather, they use emissions in the US as a defensive measure, right, as a way to sort of say, well, what you're asking of us is not fair. Right. So we're seeing less of that argument about, you know, from the sort of common but differentiated responsibilities dynamic of unfairness, I think just because Chinese emissions are so large and exceed everyone else's by so much that whereas 10 years ago, you would see very specific arguments constantly being made about historical emissions per capita emissions, fairness, and these these types of things. That's still implicit and everything that's being said, but it's not being made as forcefully just because it draws some attention to just the the sheer size of Chinese emissions.
Amber Rudd
And if I may add that Alicia, of course, China will be quick to point out, the emissions per head is higher in the US than it is in China.
Alicia Kearns
Certainly, right. Next question for the panel, is how likely is China to use climate change in the climate negotiations to win geopolitical concessions? And what kind of concessions will they be trying to secure beyond, for example, genocides now? I'm actually pushing quite hard to stop talking about that. But beyond that, well, does the panel think and does Beijing ultimately see climate change as a strategic issue?
Isabel Hilton
May I add on that. I think there's been some exaggeration of the degree to which China is trying to hold climate hostage for other issues. There was one remark by Wang Yi, who's the foreign minister, who actually doesn't do the climate negotiations. It's not something that I I've ever heard Xie Zhenhua, say, and Xie Zhenhua is the man you need to watch. It's not something that I've heard from actually anyone outside the foreign ministry, which is - Alex will confirm - is a relatively junior ministry in the hierarchy and the power hierarchy in China.
So, unless someone can give me, you know, a bit more evidence than then one metaphor about deserts, I kind of hold my fire on that. And I think I would, I mean, the burden of what I've been saying, up till now is that China's doing climate for its own reasons, and those are powerful reasons. And those are embedded reasons. They're embedded in an industrial strategy. And it's not something that they are, you know, I can imagine them throwing away for a notional gain on less scrutiny of Xinjiang. And in any event, you know, more or less scrutiny in Xinjiang doesn't change the climate trajectories. So I think that, you know, we, on our side, also ought to realize that you can have many, many quarrels with China over many, many issues, you know, the climate doesn't care about those. So, you know, please, can we, you know, at least focus on the existential question, and you know not allow others to try to instrumentalize climate as a means of pursuing other agendas with China. I just think it doesn't help.
Alicia Kearns
Alex, you look like you're waiting to come in there.
Alex Wang
Oh, yeah. So I agree with that. I think it's probably been overplayed in the press, this notion that there's some tight trade off it, you know, I'm not a diplomat. So I defer to those who know more about that than me. But I would love to see more evidence that this is actually going on. But it's not to say that there aren't issues that are difficult. Just say, like solar tariffs in the US, right. That is something that's affecting the speed of deployment of solar in the United States. You know, it's ostensibly to support US trade goals, but it is an area where you know, we have to admit that there are risks and that these things are not completely separate. And they may try to raise this as an issue as as in connection with climate change. But, you know, in those areas, I think that the US on trade should fight hard on to support its own trade goals, but also do its best to make sure that trade battles don't affect the climate, through policies that channel tariffs towards solar rebates or something like that.
Alicia Kearns
Right, I'm aware, we've only got just under 10 minutes left. So I'm actually going to go back to the topic of today's discussion, which is covering Cop 26 and China, what does success look like? I'd be really grateful for each of our panelists could give us a kind of final kind of couple sentences on what would win look like for the UK at COP 26, but also the international community? What are those terms of success that are more subtle, but also more obvious, we might see coming out of COP 26. It's always unfair to go to the first person first. But I'm gonna look Alex, it's key. Alex, straight over to you please, with success would look like.
Alex Wang
So I think this year, it's meant to be the big ratchet in the Paris Agreement, right? So you want to see that the ratchet has turned effectively, right. And so we're going to have to add up all the NDCs and see where that leads us. And then the other issue is going setting the stage so that we can verify what's going on, we have the information. There's a lot of discussion about sort of unifying metrics or making more consistency. And so it's easier to see what people are doing. I think that's critical going forward. So I think those two big things are things I would highlight.
Alicia Kearns
Isabel over to you.
Isabel Hilton
Yes, the ratchet, the ratchet is is related to the credibility of the Paris Agreement, we're not negotiating a new agreement here, we're trying to demonstrate that the one we have works. And I think that for me, success is the survival of the commitment to that process across the board, because it is infuriating, slow, cumbersome, it may be but it is what we have. And it has - don't forget - delivered a lot to date. And without it, we you know, we just lose the battle. So I think that coming up with a better understanding of, of how real it gets from now on. I mean, from now on, it's not about why it's about how we do, what we have to do. And that involves very, very real interest, very real resistance, very real opportunities, all of those things, to be very clear about that. And to develop much better mechanisms for implementation for monitoring for sharing burdens, and for keeping our sense of purpose. That's what success will look like for me.
Alicia Kearns
Thank you Isabel, Amber over to you.
Amber Rudd
Thank you. And the progress in the past six years has been in government setting policy, which is why COP is so important, because it's the government's that set the policy, and then the private sector delivering within that. If you had said to me six years ago that the UK Government would ban the internal combustion engine by 2030. Nobody would have believed it. It's been incredibly successful setting policy and letting the private sector decide you can buy an electric car in China on Alibaba for $12,000, apparently. So this is all coming towards us. So success at the end of Glasgow will be clear signals from the government, which will lead to regulation for all governments that will allow the private sector to flourish. And there is a wall of investment of green financing private equity funds, of inventors of new technology. If those signals come out clearly, then that will be the definition of success because our green industrial revolution will flow.
Alicia Kearns
Thank you so much, Amber. With which case I'm going to slowly bring us to a close. I think a measure of success is definitely audience retention on Zoom, you can measure it, and I think we've lost just three participants. So that is all credit to our amazing speakers. So thank you so much, Isabel. Thank you, Amber. Thank you, Alex, particularly the early hour it is with you. Please guys, keep an eye China Research Group we will continue to do of the moment and interesting Zoom events, and hopefully at some point in person events, and we'd love to have you come down but also if you think there's a topic we should be doing for a future event, please do drop us a line. We'd love to see what you will want to hear more about on China. So which case thank you everyone for your time this morning. And thank you again to our three panelists for being so wonderful. And thank you to Julia and Chris who do all the work behind this scenes to make these events happen and let's see how it goes the next few weeks good luck to COP 26 I'm sure we've all got our fingers crossed. Brilliant. Thank you.